This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with continuous private signals. In equilibrium, some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting, in deference to those with higher-quality signals. Even as the number of highly-informed peers grows large, however, citizens with only moderate expertise continue voting, so that voter participation remains at realistic levels (e.g. 50% or 60%, for simple examples). The precise level of voter turnout, along with the margin of victory, are determined by the distribution of expertise. Improving a voter's information makes her more willing to vote, consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence, but makes her peers more willing to abstain, providing a new explanation for various empirical patterns of voting. Equilibrium participation is optimal, even though the marginal voter may have very little (e.g. below-average) expertise, and even though non-voters'information is not utilized.
Introduction
One of the strongest endorsements of democracy ever made was in 1785 by the political philosopher and mathematician, Nicolas de Condorcet. His argument was a statistical one: if a large number of individuals independently attempt to assess the strengths of two policy alternatives (or candidates) and vote for the superior policy, then the policy that is in fact superior will almost surely receive a majority of votes (see Young 1988) . 1 Condorcet's proof assumes that all citizens vote, however, and also assumes that voters'private opinions are equally reliable; in reality, many citizens abstain, and on any given issue, there are inevitably some voters with substantial expertise and others who know very little. An individual therefore faces a dilemma: if she has a tentative opinion about the merits of existing policy proposals, but also recognizes that she lacks expertise on an issue, should she vote? Or leave the election to others, who know more about the issue? On one hand, if she abstains, she deprives the electorate of her particular judgment and expertise; on the other hand, in a large electorate, there are likely to be many who know more than she does about the issue at hand. How voters answer these questions will determine collective outcomes, such as voter turnout, the margin of victory, and ultimately the quality of the collective decision. Many observers, for example, interpret low and declining voter turnout as indicative of poor decision quality, and take great e¤ort to increase participation, whether by instilling a sense of civic duty, or by punishing non-voters with stigma, or even …nes. At the same time, others are troubled by voter ignorance, and make e¤orts to discourage or even prevent uninformed citizens from voting. From society's perspective, then, it is natural to ask, what level of voter participation aggregates information optimally?
To answer these questions, this paper constructs a general model of information and voting. The basic structure is Condorcet's (1785) classic common value environment: members of an electorate pursue a common objective but disagree over which of two policies is most likely to achieve the desired outcome. Individual opinions are modeled as private signals of an unknown state of the world, which determines which policy is superior. The precision of each individual's signal depends on her expertise, however, which is drawn from a known distribution. Voting is costless, but citizens may also abstain.
The distribution of expertise in this model is quite general. In particular, it may be continuous. In the context of the model, this implies that uninformative signals are realized with zero probability; in other words, every citizen tentatively favors one of the two policy alternatives. This may seem to suggest that everyone will vote, but to the contrary, many ignore their own signals in equilibrium, and abstain. This is because of the "swing voter's curse"identi…ed by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) : since her peers are more likely to vote for the superior policy than the inferior policy, a citizen's own vote is most likely to be pivotal (i.e. change the election outcome) when she mistakenly votes for the inferior policy. 2 In other words, a citizen relies on the judgment of her more expert peers-even if it contradicts her own-just as she might rely on expert professional advice.
In a small election, a citizen can reasonably expect to be among the best-informed members of the electorate. In a large election, however, she expects an arbitrarily large number of better-informed peers. This may seem to suggest the intuition that, no matter how accurate her own information is, a citizen should eventually abstain, when the electorate is su¢ ciently large. Again to the contrary, however, citizens with only moderate levels of expertise continue voting, even in the limit: although a pivotal vote does provide growing evidence of a mistake as the electorate grows large, this e¤ect tapers o¤ as an absolute difference of one or two votes declines in signi…cance. 3 In simple examples, in fact, citizens of quite low (e.g. below-average) expertise vote, so that turnout approaches 50% or 60% of the electorate. Such levels are the same order of magnitude as turnout in actual public elections, which is an important result, because rational voting models are notorious for the inability to predict realistic levels of voter turnout. 4 It may seem unlikely that citizens with such low expertise can improve the election decision of their (arbitrarily many) better-informed peers. The result that such citizens do not abstain on their own may therefore seem to vindicate e¤orts to dissuade or prevent them from voting. On the other hand, the general rule that more information is always better may seem to endorse e¤orts to increase turnout, like compulsory voting laws. After all, voluntary elections fail to utilize non-voters'information. Ultimately, neither of these intuitions is correct: the optimal level of voter participation arises precisely in equilibrium. 5 The …rst intuition ignores Condorcet's (1785) classic insight that a large number of poorly informed voters can be better informed (collectively) than any expert. The second intuition 2 The swing voter's curse takes its name from the "winner's curse" that arises in common-value auctions because a bid only wins (i.e. is "pivotal") when it exceeds all competing bids, suggesting that a bidder has overestimated the auction item's value (see Milgrom and Weber 1982) . 3 The proof of this result utilizes the limiting ratios of pivot probabilities, derived by Myerson (2000) , which is one technical contribution of this paper. 4 Aldrich (1997, p. 373) calls voter turnout "the Achilles' heel of rational choice theory". For recent reviews, see Feddersen (2004) and Geys (2006b) . In assuming that voting is costless, this paper does not address the standard "paradox" of costly voting, but as Section 6 discusses, recognizes that costs do not deter voting, and that abstention occurs in costless environments as well. 5 As in Condorcet's (1785) original analysis, this implies that a large electorate almost surely identi…es the better of two policies.
fails to recognize the informative content of a citizen's decision to vote, which is lost when voting is compulsory. In addition to predicting realistic levels of turnout, this model highlights information as one of the central determinants of voter participation, consistent with a variety of available empirical evidence. The connection between information and voter turnout is nuanced, however, because improving one citizen's information makes that citizen more willing to vote, but makes her peers more willing to abstain. Thus, turnout is highest in homogeneous electorates, but may increase or decrease as an electorate becomes generally better informed. Evidence from laboratory experiments support these predictions, as do statistical analyses of public elections. Informational considerations can also explain why margins of victory are sometimes quite large, especially on collective decisions that are in some sense obvious, such as updating archaic government procedures or constitutional language. As Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) point out, strategic delegation also provides a rationale for abstention in costless voting environments, such as roll o¤ (i.e. voting in some, but not all, races on a ballot).
In the context of public elections, of course, the assumption of common preferences is restrictive, since policies inevitably a¤ect di¤erent citizens di¤erently. Traditionally, political disputes are viewed primarily as con ‡icts of interests, with information playing a secondary role. The results of this paper are robust to various kinds of heterogeneity, but only if a certain degree of homogeneity is maintained, so that one citizen values another's expertise. This seems quite plausible, as the broad goals of most policies-such as world peace, economic stability, and reducing crime, poverty, pollution, and corruption-hold essentially unanimous appeal. Furthermore, persuasive e¤orts such as debate, policy research, endorsements, and advertising, suggest that a citizen expects her peers (once informed) to adopt her own positions. Mueller (2003, ch. 3, 14) also argues that, as explained in more detail below, apparent con ‡icts of interest may be substantially mitigated by altruistic or insurance motivations. 6 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins by summarizing related literature, and Section 3 introduces the formal model. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 characterize equilibrium behavior in small and large electorates, respectively, and Section 4.3 presents illustrative examples. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 then analyze comparative statics and welfare, and Section 5 discusses the robustness of the central results to generalizing the structure 6 Ethical considerations such as altruism and civic duty are also frequently o¤ered as explanations for costly voting (e.g. Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2005; Feddersen and Sandroni 2006; Evren 2010). Such motivations are most natural in a common-value environment, where voting provides a bona …de public good; in private-value settings, voting merely pulls policy outcomes in a voter's own favor, so there is no clear ethical basis for voting or encouraging others to vote. of information and preferences. Section 6 discusses empirical applications, and Section 7 concludes. Mathematical proofs are presented in the appendix.
Related Literature
The basic logic of strategic abstention and the empirical application of abstention in costless voting environments are the focus of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) . As Section 4.3 explains, that model (without partisans) can be viewed in the context of this paper as the special case of a discrete distribution of expertise, for which signals are either perfectly informative or completely uninformative. Voting and abstention are less surprising in that case, since perfectly informed citizens have no reason to abstain, and those with no information have no reason to vote. More importantly, central results regarding the level of participation are not applicable, because the sizes of the two groups are speci…ed exogenously. With continuous signals, every citizen possesses some private information, and none is infallible. Continuous signals also imply more realistic heterogeneity, avoid the need for complicated mixed strategies in equilibrium, and facilitate the more nuanced comparative statics analysis of Section 4.4, along with its applications. 7 In a common-value election environment similar to this, Krishna and Morgan (2010) demonstrate the informational ine¢ ciency of compulsory voting, and further show that this extends to costly elections, despite the fact that information is under-provided in that case, because only a tiny fraction of the electorate votes. While complementary, the two models di¤er in the source of ine¢ ciency. Here, it arises from weighing heterogeneous signals equally. There, citizens are homogeneous, but signals of the two states of the world are not equally informative, so to compensate, citizens respond to the less informative signal by mixing between voting and abstaining-or by voting uninformatively, if abstention is prohibited.
Extensions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) focus primarily on the structure of preferences, rather than information. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) extend both, but focus on the former. In their model, preferences have both a private-and a common-value dimension, and (in most speci…cations) signals are of heterogeneous quality, though not all are informative. Like this paper, those authors analyze turnout in large elections. As Section 5.2 explains, however, abstention declines in that model as the electorate grows, because citizens increasingly vote on the basis of private values, trusting commonly-valued information to be aggregated from their peers, so depending on the model speci…cations, abstention may all but vanish in the limit. In contrast, abstention in this model increases (consistent with evidence described in Section 6.2) as citizens in larger electorates increasingly defer to those with better information, but turnout remains substantial in the limit. 8 In addition to studies of participation and information aggregation in democracy, this paper relates to studies of participation and information aggregation in markets, and other settings. In such settings, expertise plays a similar role. In capital markets, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) discuss how uninformed traders use market prices to infer information from those who are informed. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2010) show that the least informed traders abstain from trading, to avoid losing wealth to those with superior information. 9 Their analysis assumes a small participation utility; as this decreases, only the best-informed traders continue to participate, until in the limit no one is willing to trade, as in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) . Participation in elections does not similarly fall to zero because relationships are inherently cooperative, rather than adversarial.
The Model
An electorate consists of N citizens where, following Myerson (1998 Myerson ( , 2000 , N is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean n. Together, these citizens must choose a policy (or candidate) from the set fA; Bg, by majority vote. The state of the world, ! 2 f ; g, is not directly observable when the vote is taken, but citizens agree that policy A is superior in state and policy B is superior in state . Speci…cally, every citizen's utility function is
Expected utility is simply the probability of choosing the superior policy. Ex ante, both states of the world are equally likely.
Independently of !, each citizen, i, is endowed with information quality q i 2 1 2 ; 1 , representing her level of expertise on the issue at hand. This is drawn independently from a common distribution F , which has smooth density f that is strictly positive on
10 Each citizen also observes a signal s i 2 fa; bg, representing her private opinion as to which policy is superior. The accuracy of a citizen's signal is determined by her level of expertise. Speci…cally, Pr (ajq i ; ) = Pr (bjq i ; ) = q i . The highest quality signal thus reveals ! perfectly, while the lowest quality signal reveals nothing. The distribution of 8 Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) also give an example in which turnout falls as information improves, but provide no general result comparable to those of Section 4.4 below. 9 Those authors treat the special case of betting markets, but the intuition applies more generally. 10 As Section 5.1 discusses, these restrictions on F simplify the exposition, but are not necessary for the results below. Accordingly, not all of the distributions illustrated in Section 4.3 have full support. expertise is common knowledge, but q i and s i are private information. Signal values are mutually independent (conditional on !) and also independent of q i and N .
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Conditional on observing a signal s of quality q, a citizen's updated belief (!jq; s) about the state of the world is given by Bayes'rule:
Thus, q i also measures a citizen's con…dence that she has correctly identi…ed the superior policy.
After observing her private information, an individual may vote (at no cost) for either policy, or may abstain. A strategy : ; 1 fa; bg ! fA; B; 0g speci…es behavior for each realized quality type q 2 1 2 ; 1 and signal value s 2 fa; bg, where a vote for policy 0 represents abstention. 12 The numbers N A and N B of votes for either policy depend on the total number of citizens in the electorate, and on each voter's strategy, in combination with her private information. The policy that receives more votes is implemented, breaking a tie if necessary by a fair coin toss. The strategy i is a best response to opponent strategies if i (q; s) maximizes the probability of electing the superior policy, for every (q; s) 2 ; 1 fa; bg. A pro…le of strategies is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if it speci…es a strategy for each player that is the best response to her opponents. In games of Poisson population uncertainty such as this, equilibria are necessarily symmetric, specifying identical behavior for each player. 13 Thus, an equilibrium pro…le can be represented by a single strategy . 11 A more standard formulation of private information posits a single, continuous signal. As Section 5.1 explains, the decomposition into q i and s i imposes symmetry on such a formulation, but is otherwise equivalent, and is useful for the comparative statics analysis of Section 4.4.
12 Mixed strategies play an important role in discrete models such as Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) , and could be allowed here, but with continuous signals, mixed strategies would not be played in equilibrium (by Lemma 1). 13 This is because the …nite set of citizens who actually play the game is a random draw from an in…nite set of potential players, for whom strategies are de…ned (see Myerson 1998) . The distribution of opponent behavior is therefore the same for any two individuals (in contrast with a game between a …nite set of players), implying that a best response for one citizen is a best response for all.
Analysis

Equilibrium
If a citizen follows the strategy then, in state ! 2 f ; g, she takes action x 2 fA; B; 0g with probability v x (!), given by the following,
where I is an indicator function. Since the total number of citizens N has Poisson distribution with parameter n, and since fractions v A (!) and v B (!) of the electorate vote for policies A and B, respectively, the numbers N A and N B of A and B votes are independent Poisson random variables, with parameters nv A (!) and nv B (!), by the decomposition property of Poisson random variables (see Myerson 1998) . Accordingly, the probability of any voting outcome is merely the product of Poisson probabilities. For example, let m ( ) denote the probability in state that the superior policy (i.e. policy A) wins the election by a margin of exactly m votes (or loses by jmj, if m is negative). This is the probability of observing k + m votes for policy A and k votes for policy B, summed over all possible values of k,
Similarly, let m ( ) denote the probability in state with which the superior policy (i.e. policy B) wins by exactly m votes,
By the environmental equivalence property of Poisson games (see Myerson, 1998) , an individual from within the game reinterprets N A and N B as the number of A and B votes cast by her peers; by voting herself, she can add one to either total. Of particular interest, therefore, are the probabilities 0 (!), 1 (!), and 1 (!) of a tie, a one-vote win, and a one-vote loss-events in which a single additional vote would be pivotal in the election. 14 A common objection to strategic voting models is voters in the real world do not seem cognizant of pivot probabilities, which are also presumably quite miniscule, and therefore di¢ cult to estimate accurately. In favor of strategic voting, Abramson et al. (1992) , Alvarez and Nagler (2000) , and Fujiwara (2011) present evidence that voters support second-choice candidates when …rst-choice candidates seem unlikely to win, consistent with the logic of Duverger's (1954) law. Voters also behave strategically in the laboratory setting of Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008 Palfrey ( , 2009 ) and Morton and Tyran (2011) , although they fail to do so Speci…cally, an additional vote for the superior policy is pivotal if that policy either ties the election and loses the tie-breaking coin toss, or wins the coin toss but loses the election by exactly one vote. Let P (!) denote the combined probability of such an event.
Similarly, a vote for the inferior policy is pivotal with probabilityP (!).
If the state of the world turns out to be and a citizen's vote for policy B reverses the election outcome, she receives a utility bene…t of u (Bj ) u (Aj ) = 1. On the other hand, if the state of the world is and her B vote changes the election outcome, she su¤ers a utility penalty of u (Bj ) u (Aj ) = 1. From the voter's perspective, these events occur with probabilities ( jq; s) P ( ) and ( jq; s)P ( ), respectively. Therefore, the expected bene…t 0B (q; s) of voting for policy B instead of abstaining is given by
Substituting ( jq; s) = 1 ( jq; s), this is positive if and only if ( jq; s) exceeds the threshold^ 0B ,^
In other words, a citizen prefers voting for policy B to abstaining if she is su¢ ciently con…dent that the state is . Similarly, the expected bene…t A (q; s) = ( jq; s) P ( ) ( jq; s)P ( ) of voting A is positive if and only if ( jq; s) is less than
re ‡ecting a strong belief that the state is . 
even in the very simple setting of Esponda and Vespa (2011) . In this model, Theorem 5 ultimately proves an equivalence between strategic behavior and socially optimal behavior. Thus, even without thinking about pivot probabilities, a voter could behave as if she were strategic, simply by determining which voter types should be voting, from a social planner's perspective, and then following her own recommendation. ; 1 fa; bg.
The discussion above makes clear that a voter's best response to is to vote B when her posterior ( jq; s) exceeds both^ AB and^ 0B , and to vote A when ( jq; s) falls below both^ AB and^ A0 . In other words, the best response to any opponent strategy is a belief threshold strategy, as Proposition 1 now states.
Proposition 1 i is a best response to only if i is a belief threshold strategy.
Given the symmetry of this model, it is natural to focus attention on a belief threshold strategy 1 T;T that is symmetric around 1 2 , which can be rewritten with a single subscript, as a quality threshold strategy T , de…ned below. With such a strategy, a citizen who receives an a signal never votes for policy B, and a citizen who receives a b signal never votes for policy A. In either case, she votes if and only if her expertise exceeds a quality threshold T , and abstains otherwise. 15 De…nition 2 T is a quality threshold strategy, with quality threshold ; 1 fa; bg.
Since a quality threshold strategy prescribes symmetric behavior in response to a and b signals, and since signals arise symmetrically in the two states of the world, behavior is also symmetric with respect to the state. In either state, for example, a citizen votes for the superior policy (i.e. for A in state , and for B in state ) with probability
votes for the inferior policy with probability
and abstains with probability
Symmetric voting behavior produces symmetric electoral outcomes. In either state, for example, the numbers N + and N of votes for the superior policy and the inferior policy have Poisson distributions, with parameters np + and np , respectively. The probability m with which the superior candidate wins by exactly m votes is also invariant across states.
So are the probabilities P andP with which votes for the superior policy and votes for the inferior policy, respectively, are pivotal.
With symmetric pivot probabilities, the belief threshold in (5) reduces to^ AB = 1 2 , and the thresholds in (3) and (4) reduce symmetrically around
Thus, the best response to a quality threshold strategy T is another quality threshold strategy, with a quality threshold T br given by (12) . Proposition 2 states this result formally, and also points out that
as long as T < 1, implying that a positive fraction of the electorate abstains (i.e. v 0 > 0) in response to T . Proposition 2 (Swing voter' s curse) i is a best response to the quality threshold strategy T only if i is a quality threshold strategy T br , with quality threshold T br =P P +P .
Furthermore, 1 2 T br < 1, with strict inequality if T < 1.
The result that citizens abstain may be surprising in light of the fact that each citizen possesses private information that leads her to strictly prefer one policy over the other. The Figure 1 : Equilibrium threshold T logic behind Proposition 2 is that voting is informative, so the superior policy likely receives a larger vote share than the inferior policy, and in particular is more likely to win by a single vote than to lose by a single vote. This implies, however, that an additional vote for the superior policy is less likely to be pivotal than a vote for the inferior policy. Conditional on casting a pivotal vote, therefore, an uninformed citizen believes that she has voted for the wrong policy, and prefers to have abstained. In other words, she su¤ers from the "swing voter's curse"even though she is not uninformed. Put di¤erently, a citizen abstains to avoid accidentally overturning the decision of those who are better informed.
Since the best response to a quality threshold strategy T is another threshold strategy T br , the best response threshold T br can be interpreted as a (continuous) mapping from the (compact) set of thresholds into itself. Brouwer's theorem therefore guarantees the existence of a …xed point T , which as Theorem 1 now states, characterizes a quality threshold strategy T that is its own best response, and thus an equilibrium in the voting game. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . The additional result that 1 2 < T < 1 follows from Proposition 2, and implies that, in equilibrium, a positive fraction of the electorate votes, and a positive fraction abstains.
Theorem 1
There exists a quality threshold T strictly between 1 2 and 1 such that T is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In stating the existence of an equilibrium quality threshold strategy, Theorem 1 leaves open the possibility of other types of equilibria. As Theorem 2 now states, however, the symmetry of the model rules out this possibility. In other words, if a citizen votes at all in equilibrium, she votes in accordance with her signal; her decision is simply whether to vote or abstain.
Theorem 2
If is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium then it is a quality threshold strategy.
The best response function illustrated in Figure 1 exhibits a unique …xed point, but formally, Theorem 2 does not guarantee a unique equilibrium. Informally, it appears that the equilibrium is indeed unique, as long as the information distribution is well-behaved. To see this, note in Figure 1 that multiple equilibria only exist if T br …rst crosses the 45-degree line from above, and then rises quickly to cross again from below. This could occur if F were discrete, for example, so that as T increased through an atom of F , a positive fraction of the least-informed voters would suddenly abstain, discontinuously raising the average quality of a vote, and with it the best-response quality threshold. Discrete distributions are ruled out by assumption, of course, but can be approximated arbitrarily closely by continuous distributions. To rule out this possibility, Theorem 4 in Section 4.2 restricts attention to density functions that are log-concave, and states formally that any sequence of equilibrium thresholds approaches a unique limit. Thus, if multiple equilibria exist in …nite electorates, they converge as the electorate grows large.
Large Elections
Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 4.1 characterize equilibrium voting behavior for a …xed population size parameter n. This section analyzes voting behavior as n grows large. Lemma 1 begins by showing that the swing voter's curse intensi…es as an electorate grows: for any quality threshold strategy T (with T < 1) the best response threshold T br n increases with n. As the entire best-response function increases, so does its …xed point T n . 16 As the participation threshold increases, voter participation decreases.
Lemma 1 For any T < 1, the best-response quality threshold T br n increases in n.
One intuition for Lemma 1 is that a poorly informed citizen, who would otherwise abstain, votes when the electorate is small, to hedge against the possibility that her peers'information quality turns out to be even lower than her own. This possibility becomes remote as the electorate grows large, so eventually she abstains. This begs the question, however, of who 16 If there are multiple equilibrium …xed points, the implication of Lemma 1 is that the lowest and highest of these both increase with n.
continues voting in the limit. After all, in a su¢ ciently large electorate, even a highly expert voter (e.g. q i = :99) should expect an arbitrarily large number of peers with better information than her own. This might seem to suggest that a citizen of any information level should eventually abstain-or in other words, that T n should approach 1. If so, this would be reminiscent of Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1996) model (with balanced partisan groups), where uninformed voters abstain with increasing probability until, in the limit, only (perfectly) informed agents continue to vote. Since no one in this model is perfectly informed, that would imply that voter turnout approaches 0%.
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Assessing the validity of this intuition requires deriving an expression for the limit of the best-response quality threshold T br n =P n Pn+Pn . This is facilitated by Myerson's (2000) elegant result that the ratio of pivot probabilities in large elections approaches the square root of the ratio of vote probabilities:
, de…ned as follows,
where E (q i jq i T ) is the average expertise of a citizen who actually votes. Since T n is a …xed point of T br n (T ) for every n, a limit point T 1 of any sequence of equilibrium quality thresholds must be a …xed point of (13) . 18 Equivalently, T 1 solves
Theorem 3 now states that such a solution exists, and that T 1 < 1.
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Equation (14) actually has another solution at
Accordingly, a sequence of equilibrium thresholds cannot converge to one. In fact, T 1 is an upper bound on T n , implying that there is no equilibrium in a population of any size for which turnout is lower than 1 F (T 1 ). Thus, contrary to the intuition above, moderately informed citizens continue voting, no matter how large the electorate grows, and voter turnout remains positive even in an arbitrarily large electorate. 17 This would also resemble non-participation in capital markets, as discussed in Section 2. 18 In discussing sequences, this section implicitly assumes, for simplicity, that n is a natural number. 19 The technical condition that lim T !1
f (T ) < 1 merely excludes electorates that are arbitrarily close to being perfectly informed, and is su¢ cient but not necessary for Theorem 3: if F (q) = 1 1 2 q 1 2 1= , with > 1, for example, then the condition is violated but nevertheless T 1 < 1.
Figure 2: Unique convergence of equilibrium threshold
Theorem 3 If fT n g is a sequence of equilibrium quality thresholds then it has a limit point
A partial intuition for Theorem 3 is that, while a citizen indeed expects a large number of extremely well-informed peers ex ante, she bases her behavior on the conditional belief that a surprisingly large fraction have simultaneously erred, thereby rendering her own vote pivotal. Additionally, note that the vote totals N + and N for the superior and inferior policies are independent Poisson random variables with parameters nv + and nv , respectively, so that as n gets large, the margin of victory M = N + N can be approximated by a normal distribution with mean E (M ) = n (v + v ) and variance V (M ) = n (v + + v ). The ratio of probabilities of a one-vote loss to a one-vote win can thus be approximated by
where is the standard normal pdf. The expected margin of victory E (M ) grows unboundedly with the number of voters; by itself, this fact would make a one-vote loss exponentially less likely than a one-vote win, leading even arbitrarily expert citizens to eventually abstain. The variance V (M ) of the margin of victory also grows, however, so a di¤erence of two votes becomes less and less meaningful, and the ratio
remains constant. 20 In stating the existence of a limiting equilibrium quality threshold, Theorem 3 (like Theorem 1) makes no claim about uniqueness. This is an important issue, in light of existing game-theoretic literature in which equilibria with high and low voter turnout both exist (e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983). As Theorem 4 now states, however, the limiting threshold T 1 is indeed unique for the large class of distribution functions that have log-concave densities. 21 This condition is actually stronger than necessary for uniqueness; intuitively, the important thing is that a density is su¢ ciently "smooth". 22 This logic is illustrated in Figure 2 : for equation (14) to have multiple solutions, E (q i jq i T ) (which increases in T ) must …rst rise gradually until it intersects
2 from above, and then rise quickly to intersect
again from below. This would be possible if, for example, the density of expertise included atoms, or "spikes"of probability, but is not possible when the density is su¢ ciently "smooth" (e.g. log-concave).
Theorem 4
If f is log-concave then there exists a unique limit point T 1 such that for any sequence fT n g of equilibrium participation thresholds, T n ! T 1 .
The result that the limiting threshold T 1 is uniquely determined by the distribution F of expertise on the issue at hand implies that, in large elections, F also determines the precise level of voter turnout ,
along with the margin of victory (as a fraction of the number who voted),
Section 4.3 illustrates this by deriving and for several simple information distributions. Section 4.4 then provides a more general analysis of how turnout and margins of victory 20 This observation suggests that the logic of Theorem 3 does not depend on the assumption of population uncertainty; if N = n were …xed and known, for example, N + and N , together with the number of abstentions, would follow a trinomial distribution. When n is large, therefore, M could still be approximated by a normal distribution with the same mean, but now with variance
This also grows at rate n, so the ratio E(M+) V (M+) still remains constant. 21 A density f is log-concave if ln [f (q)] is concave, or equivalently, if
f (q) is decreasing in q. A Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show, many of the most familiar distribution functions exhibit this property. 22 All of the densities illustrated below exhibit unique limiting equilibrium thresholds, for example, but not all are log-concave. 
Examples
Theorem 3 in Section 4.2 states that the equilibrium quality threshold remains bounded below one, so that turnout remains positive in large electorates, but leaves open the theoretical possibility that the bound on turnout is extremely close to one, so that turnout is positive but negligible. To investigate this possibility, this section uses equation (14) to compute limiting equilibrium thresholds for some simple example distributions. The resulting levels of equilibrium turnout are actually quite high. For example, the …rst frame of Figure 3 illustrates a uniform distribution of expertise. This distribution exhibits a unique participation threshold T 1 = 1 p 2 0:71, which from (15) implies that 59% of a large electorate votes in equilibrium.
A uniform distribution is simple, but perhaps unrealistic. A natural by-product of specialization, for example, is that only a small fraction of the electorate possess signi…cant expertise on any particular issue. Accordingly, the second frame of Figure 3 illustrates a distribution that is right-skewed. This produces a limiting quality threshold of T 1 0:64, implying 52% turnout. Both of these are slightly lower than for the uniform case.
The …rst two frames of Figure 3 both presume that some voters are essentially infallible. Another possibility is that policy issues are su¢ ciently complex that even the best-informed members of the electorate have di¢ culty predicting which policies will be e¤ective. To treat this possibility, the third frame of Figure 3 depicts an extreme distribution, in which even 23 Strictly speaking, these labels for and are misnomers, as turnout N++N N and the margin of victory
are actually random variables. More precisely, denotes the probability with which an individual votes, and describes how much more likely she is to vote for the superior policy than the inferior policy, conditional on voting at all. the most expert citizen can determine the better of two policies with only 51% accuracy. In that case, the limiting threshold is T 1 :503 and equilibrium turnout is 56% in large electorates.
The distributions depicted in Figure 3 di¤er substantially from one another, but in every case the participation threshold remains bounded well below one. In fact, voter turnout in every case is well within the range observed in actual public elections: approximately half of the electorate votes, while the other half abstains. Perhaps surprisingly, this implies that even citizens of below-average expertise continue to vote. In the case of the …rst distribution, such citizens vote despite the presence of peers who are arbitrarily well-informed. In the third distribution, the marginal citizen votes even though she is only barely better informed than a balanced coin. Figure 2 suggests that the examples depicted in Figure 3 are not particularly special: the function
2 …rst rises steeply, and then ‡attens out between
and 1, making it likely that, for a variety of distributions, E (q i jq i T ) will intersect
2 at some threshold close to 1 2 . From equation (16) , the margins of victory associated with the three distributions example depicted in Figure 3 can be computed as 70%, 52%, and 1%. In real-world public elections, of course, the last of these is most typical. This suggests that, of the three distributions, the last is actually likely to be the most realistic. More generally, rewriting (16) as E (q i jq i > T 1 ) = :5 + :5 makes clear that an expected margin of victory smaller than, say, …ve percent, requires that the average vote quality not exceed 0:525. At the same time, the …rst two examples illustrate that the margin of victory can also be quite high when the average vote quality for a particular issue is high-a point emphasized in Sections 4.5 and 6. In addition to the continuous distributions depicted in Figure 3 , equation (14) applies to discrete distributions, as Section 5.1 emphasizes below. Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1996) model (without partisans), for example, corresponds to a discrete distribution consisting of two mass points, at q = 1 2 and q = 1. In that case, E (q i jq i T ) = 1 for any T > 1 2 , so T 1 = 1, and only perfectly informed citizens vote in equilibrium. In contrast, the classic model of Condorcet (1785) corresponds to a degenerate distribution around q i = q, for which E (q i jq i T ) = q for any T < q. In Figure 2 , this can be illustrated as a horizontal line at height q, connecting the y-axis with the 45-degree line, which clearly intersects
2 at T 1 < q, implying that everyone votes in equilibrium.
Comparative Statics
Section 4.2 demonstrates that, in large electorates, equilibrium turnout and the margin of victory are uniquely determined by the underlying distribution of information-at least if the density f is log-concave. Maintaining that assumption, this section compares the limiting equilibrium quality thresholds T 1F and T 1G associated with two information distributions, along with equilibrium turnout F and G and margins of victory F and G . Proposition 3 begins by comparing an electorate F with another G that is better informed, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. 24 The result is ambiguous: turnout can be higher in either electorate. This is because improving an individual's information has two o¤setting e¤ects: it makes that individual more willing to vote, but makes her peers more willing to abstain. In terms of the model, it lifts non-voters above the participation threshold, but also causes the participation threshold to rise. The impact on the margin of victory is similarly ambiguous: improving voter expertise increases the superior policy's margin of victory, but as non-voters cross the participation threshold they become voters of below-average expertise, so the margin of victory falls.
The net e¤ect of improved information depends on whose information improves. Proposition 3 demonstrates this by delineating three cases that are unambiguous. These are illustrated in Figure 4 , starting from the uniform distribution of Figure 3 : (1) improving non-voters' information has no e¤ect, if it does not lift them above the participation threshold; (2) improving voters' information raises the margin of victory and strengthens the swing voter's curse, thereby lowering turnout; (3) moderate improvements in nonvoters'information increase turnout by pushing non-voters above the participation threshold, thereby lowering the margin of victory and weakening the swing voter's curse so that turnout increases even further. 25 Proposition 3 Let F and G have log-concave densities f and g, and suppose that G …rst-order stochastically dominates F . Then the following are true:
, and g (q) = f (q) for all q E F (q i jq i T 1F ), then T 1G < T 1F , G > F , and G < F . 24 As de…ned by Haldar and Russell (1969), G …rst-order stochastically dominates F if, for any quality level q, the fraction of citizens with information quality better than q is higher under G than under F (i.e. 1 G (q) 1 F (q)). Thus, signals are more precise, in the sense of Blackwell (1951) . 25 Conversely, reducing non-voters' information has no e¤ect; small reductions in voters' information increase turnout and reduce the margin of victory; and moderate reductions in voters' information reduce turnout and increase the margin of victory. Proposition 3 considers a distribution that is better informed than F . Proposition 4 now considers the possibility of a distribution G that is more homogeneous than F . Speci…cally, let F be a simple mean-preserving spread of G, as de…ned by Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) , meaning that the two distributions have the same mean, but the cumulative distribution functions cross only once. 26 As Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) show, this implies that G has a smaller variance than F . The result of Proposition 4, illustrated in Figure 5 , is that turnout is higher under G than F , and the margin of victory is lower.
Proposition 4 Let F and G have log-concave densities f and g and a common mean, and suppose that G (q) F (q) for alland G (q) F (q) for all, for someq T 1F . Then T 1G T 1F , G > F , and G < F .
One intuition for Proposition 4 is that the swing voter's curse is weak when the quality di¤erence between informed and uninformed votes is small, and strong when the quality 26 Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) Hadar and Russell's (1969) weaker condition that G second-order stochastically dominates
is not su¢ cient for Proposition 4. The uniform distribution illustrated in Figure 3 second-order stochastically dominates (and therefore has lower variance than) the discrete distribution given by P di¤erence is large. The most extreme case is Condorcet's (1785) model, in which voters are identical (i.e. q i has zero variance) and turnout is 100%.
The statements of Propositions 3 and 4 may seem to indicate a negative correlation between turnout and the margin of victory , but this relationship does not hold generally. In Figure 3 , for example, the third information distribution exhibits a much smaller margin of victory than either of the …rst two, but at the same time exhibits voter turnout that is lower than in the …rst electorate and higher than in the second.
Welfare
As Figure 3 illustrates, many citizens continue to vote in large elections, even though their own expertise is extremely limited (e.g. q i = :503), and even though their peers possess much better (e.g. almost perfect) information. It may seem likely that such poorly informed votes can only reduce the accuracy of collective decisions, perhaps vindicating e¤orts to discourage (or prevent) such citizens from voting. On the other hand, since every signal is informative, the opposite intuition that more signals are always better than fewer signals might seem to endorse e¤orts to increase turnout, for example by instilling a sense of civic duty, or by making voting compulsory. After all, voluntary elections fail to utilize non-voters'information.
Contrary to either of these intuitions, Theorem 5 states that the probability of the desired election outcome is maximized in equilibrium. Since equilibrium voting necessarily involves some voter abstention, this implies that it is never optimal for all citizens to vote; adding votes beyond the equilibrium level actually reduces welfare, rather than enhancing it. On the other hand, discouraging participation by non-experts also reduces welfare: citizens who vote in equilibrium-including those in Figure 3 -actually do improve election accuracy. A third implication of Theorem 5 is that improving information can never reduce welfare, even though (as Section 4.4 shows) it may increase or decrease voter turnout: the direct e¤ect of improved information is improved election accuracy, and any equilibrium response by voters only improves welfare further. 27 Theorem 5 There exists a strategy that maximizes the probability of electing the superior policy. Furthermore, is a quality threshold strategy, with quality threshold 1 2 < T < 1, and constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 27 By similar reasoning, welfare also increases with the size of the electorate. As Footnote 14 emphasizes, another important implication of Theorem 5 is that the competing assumptions of strategic and ethical voting are behaviorally equivalent.
Showing the existence of an optimal voting strategy is not trivial, since the space of strategies is not compact under the standard topology. The proof of Theorem 5 proceeds by …rst demonstrating that every strategy is dominated by a belief threshold strategy. The set of possible belief thresholds is compact, so an optimal strategy within this class is more straightforward. That the optimal strategy constitutes an equilibrium follows from McLennan's (1998) observation that, in common interest games such as this, whatever is optimal for the group is also optimal for each individual. That is a quality threshold strategy with 1 2 < T < 1 then follows from Theorem 2 and Proposition 2. To understand how adding informative votes can reduce the quality of an election outcome, note between the quantity and quality of information: lowering the participation threshold increases the number of votes (thereby reducing the variance of the election outcome) but reduces the average quality of a vote (thereby reducing the superior policy's expected margin of victory). It is also useful to recognize that voters actually possess two pieces of private information, s i and q i . A …rst-best election mechanism would obtain both, and weight individual votes by their underlying quality, in a maximum-likelihood approach (Nitzan and Paroush 1982; Shapley and Grofman 1984) . A standard election, however, weights votes equally. Abstention allows poorly informed citizens to e¤ectively transfer weight from their own signals to those with higher quality. Put di¤erently, a citizen's vote communicates s i , while her decision to vote communicates information about q i , that would be lost if all citizens were to vote. Ultimately, some information is lost because signals are continuous but the action space for voters is inherently discrete. 28 This contrasts, for example, with models of capital markets, where in…nitely divisible assets enable participants to trade asset quantities precisely in proportion to the quality of their information, and private information is aggregated completely. Despite this coarsening of information, elections do aggregate information e¤ectively in the limit. Remark 1 states that, just as in Condorcet's (1785) original model, the equilibrium probability of electing the superior policy exceeds 1 2 , and approaches 1 as the electorate grows large. The logic is well known: the superior policy's expected vote share exceeds 1 2 , and in large electorates, the actual vote share converges to its expectation.
Remark 1 (Jury theorem) If f n g is a sequence of equilibria then Pr (Aj ; n ) 1 2 and Pr (Bj ; n ) 1 2 for all n, and lim n!1 Pr (Aj ; n ) = lim n!1 Pr (Bj ; n ) = 1.
The limiting result of Remark 1 does not depend crucially on the exact level of voter participation, but in …nite electorates, Theorem 5 provides important policy guidance for 28 One way to make voting less discrete is to allow voters to cast multiple votes. Another is to score alternatives numerically, as judges do in athletic or music competitions. In such systems, a voter can partially defer to her peers by voting for multiple policy alternatives, or awarding similar scores. maximizing the likelihood of desired election outcomes. Speci…cally, e¤orts to increase voter participation, or to dissuade citizens with limited information from voting, may both be misguided. 29 Improving non-voters'information can improve election outcomes, but only if su¢ cient learning takes place to push these individuals above the participation threshold. Improving voters' information unambiguously improves election outcomes, but will cause voter participation to fall. Thus, voter turnout seems a less useful measure of the quality of election decisions than is commonly perceived. A better gauge of quality might be the margin of victory , which in this model is a linear function of the average quality E (q i jq i T 1 ) of a vote, and is therefore largest when decisions are obvious, or voters are quite well-informed. 30 In this light, supermajority voting rules in settings such as criminal jury verdicts and constitutional amendments can be viewed as precautions against acting on the basis of insu¢ cient information. In a similar vein, McMurray (2011a) proposes a model in which informative margins of victory in public elections convey electoral "mandates"to political o¢ cials.
Robustness
Information Structure
In Section 3, citizens receive two independent pieces of private information: a continuous quality variable q i and a binary signal s i . A more standard formulation of private information instead posits a single, continuous, signal. These approaches may appear quite di¤erent, but they are actually quite similar. Speci…cally, the present formulation imposes one restriction on the more general framework, which is that the distribution of signals is symmetric, so that posteriors and 1 are equally likely. In that case, i can be decomposed according to its strength q i and direction s i , as follows: if i exceeds 1 2 , let s i = b and q i = i ; otherwise, let s i = a and q i = 1 i . It is then straightforward to verify that, as in the model above, q i is independent of s i (and of !). This decomposition is useful for expressing the comparative statics results of Section 4.4. 29 The result that equilibrium turnout is socially optimal stems partly from the assumptions that voting and acquiring private information are both costless. With costly voting, turnout is ine¢ ciently low, so raising turnout slightly can improve welfare. Even then, however, Theorem 5 implies that such e¤orts go too far if they raise turnout beyond the level that arises in equilibrium in costless environments; for example, voluntary voting is superior to mandatory voting in the costly environment of Krishna and Morgan (2010). In his model of endogenous information acquisition, Triossi (2011) does not analyze the welfare associated with a voluntary voting equilibrium, but does note that full participation is not optimal. 30 This, too, is imperfect, however. When nonvoters'information improves slightly, for example, as in part 3 of Proposition 3, welfare improves but E (q i jq i T 1 ) and fall.
In addition to symmetric signals, the model above assumes symmetric prior beliefs Pr ( ) = Pr ( ) and utility gains u (Aj ) u (Bj ) = u (Bj ) u (Aj ) in the two states, as well as a symmetric tie-breaking rule. All of this symmetry serves to simplify the model's exposition, but is not essential to the structure of equilibrium. Relaxing symmetry, Proposition 1 would still characterize best response voting as a belief threshold strategy, and Brouwer's theorem would imply the existence of a pair of equilibrium belief thresholds, even if those thresholds are no longer symmetric around 1 2 , so that equilibrium voting does not exactly reduce to a quality threshold strategy. When almost indi¤erent between the two policies, a citizen would still prefer to abstain. 31 The logic of Theorem 3 would then apply to both thresholds, so that turnout in the limit would remain positive (in both states). As a conjecture, it seems that smoothness conditions analogous to those of Theorem 4 would also imply that the limiting pair of equilibrium thresholds is unique. Beyond symmetry, Section 3 assumes a continuous distribution of expertise. Among other things, this implies that signals may be arbitrarily informative. In other economic settings, such as auctions (Wilson 1977; Milgrom 1979 , this is a key requirement for information aggregation, because it makes an individual willing to trust her own information even above a unanimous consensus among her peers. 32 In the majority election setting of this paper, however, this condition is unimportant: if q i were bounded above by q then the logic of Theorem 3 would imply that T 1 < q instead of T 1 < 1, so a positive fraction of the electorate would still continue voting in the limit. The assumption of full support merely emphasizes the main result that citizens of only moderate expertise continue voting in large electorates, even when their peers are arbitrarily well informed.
A continuous F also excludes the possibility of mass points, but this, too, is purely for simplicity. Above and below the participation threshold, mass points merely add a mass of voters or non-voters. 33 Intuitively, it may seem that an exception must be made for a mass point at q = 1, since surely citizens should defer in the limit to the positive 31 McMurray (2011a) treats the case of asymmetric utility, and Krishna and Morgan (2010) treat the case of asymmetric signal quality (with homogeneous voters). Other types of asymmetry could be treated similarly. 32 Without this condition, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) predict erroneous jury verdicts, because a juror trusts the unanimous "guilty" verdict of her peers above her own private opinion that a defendant is innocent. Similarly, Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) predict "herding" to a (possibly erroneous) permanent consensus, because individuals ignore their private signals, and follow previous movers. In large auctions, as Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) emphasize, the winning bid only approximates the auction item's true value if a bidder can trust her own estimation even when it exceeds every other bidder's. 33 If a threshold and mass point coincide, equilibrium requires mixed strategies. Also, violating the smoothness condition of Theorem 4 can induce multiple equilibria.
fraction of the electorate who are perfectly informed. Even in that case, however, Theorem 3 remains valid, implying that moderately informed citizens continue voting, even in the limit. To see this, recall that T 1 remains bounded below 1 in the proof of Theorem 3 because
2 approaches 1 with a slope approaching 0 while E (q i jq i T ) approaches 1 more gradually, with slope approaching 1 2 . A distribution with a mass point at one can be thought of as a weighted average of the continuous distribution analyzed earlier and a unit mass of perfectly informed citizens, so the slope of E (q i jq i T ) is simply a weighted average of 0 and 1 2 , which is still positive. If expertise were uniformly distributed for 80% of an electorate but the other 20% were infallible, for instance, then the left-hand side of (14) would be E (q i jq i T ) = :8
+ :2, implying that T 1 = 0:75. In other words, half of those with noisy signals would still vote, implying 60% turnout. Intuitively, moderately informed citizens vote in …nite electorates to hedge against the possibility that perfectly-informed types are not realized, and then continue voting in the limit because not all equilibrium voters are infallible.
As a …nal note, the model of Section 3 assumes that each citizen knows her precise position within the distribution of expertise, which may seem implausible. However, it is straightforward to reformulate posterior beliefs (!jq; s) or vote probabilities v x (!) to accommodate uncertainty regarding either one's own q i or the prevailing distribution F of expertise, without substantively altering the subsequent analysis. Incorrect beliefs (e.g. overcon…dence) regarding one's own or others'expertise can also be accommodated, though this requires careful assumptions about a citizen's perception of the beliefs of her peers (and beliefs about beliefs, etc.). If a citizen is aware of others'overcon…dence but not her own (and this is common knowledge), for example, then the nature of equilibrium is unchanged, but participation is higher. 34 
Heterogeneous Preferences
The model of Section 3 makes the strong assumption that voter preferences are perfectly correlated, so that if informational di¤erences could somehow be resolved, voting would be unanimous. This section extends the model to allow an imperfect (but still positive) correlation. To this end, suppose that in state a fraction 1 2 of the electorate prefer policy A, and in state the same fraction prefer policy B.
35
The model of Section 3 is then the special case of = 1. Previously, the superior policy was elected if v + > v , 34 This can be seen from Figure 1 : if citizens of type q believe themselves to have expertise q (q) > q then equilibrium occurs where the best-response function intersects q (q), which by de…nition is above the 45-degree line, and therefore to the left of the original T . 35 With this formulation, private signals are exchangeable, as in Milgrom and Weber (1982) .
which also guaranteed that citizens abstain in equilibrium. As formulated in (6) and (7), however, v + and v now re ‡ect the probabilities with which citizen i votes for and against her own preferred policy. Two individuals now only share a common interest with probability 2 + (1 )
, so citizen i votes for and against j's preferred policy with probabilities v j+ and v j , de…ned as follows.
If < 1, the di¤erence between v j+ and v j is smaller than the di¤erence between v + and v , implying that the election is closer and abstention is lower. As long as > 1 2 , however, v + > v implies that v j+ > v j , so abstention and information aggregation occur, just as before.
The assumption that preferences are positively correlated re ‡ects an assumption that policies provide public goods, which by de…nition bene…t large fractions of the electorate. Mueller (2003, ch. 3, 14) argues that even seemingly zero-sum issues may be viewed as public goods, as altruism or insurance motivations mitigate otherwise obvious con ‡icts of interest. Wealthy individuals may favor redistribution, for example, either out of concern for the poor, or for fear that they themselves may become poor in the future. 36 In Mueller's formulation, an altruist's objective function U i = u i + P j6 =i u j places positive weight > 0 on the utility u j of each of her peers, in addition to her own utility u i . This can be rewritten as a weighted average U i = (1 ) u i + n u of her own utility and the average utility u = P n j=1 u j in the population. If all citizens are altruists, the second term of this function is common, thereby inducing a correlation between U i and U j . In fact, this correlation may be quite high even if is close to zero, because the common term is proportional to the size n of the electorate. 37 Existing literature provides several alternative speci…cations of preference heterogeneity. In every case, the common theme is that con ‡icts of interest reduce a citizen's willingness to defer to the judgment of her peers, but that some abstention still occurs as long as some homogeneity is maintained. For example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) consider partisan supporters for both policies, in addition to the independents whose preferences depend on the state. This increases turnout, both because partisans all vote, and because 36 Mueller (2003, ch. 14) cites several examples of groups that vote contrary to their own interests, narrowlyde…ned. Anecdotally, expenditures on public education are quite popular even among families with no schoolaged children, and programs such as food aid and disaster relief remain quite popular, despite servicing only small segments of the electorate. 37 is quite mild. Admittedly, seemingly partisan behavior such as voting along political party lines, with little attention to the details of particular issues or candidates, is commonplace in public elections. On the other hand, McMurray (2011a) points out that "partisan" behavior and "ideological"di¤erences can also be interpreted within the context of information: if A and B are liberal and conservative policies, for example, then citizens who believe strongly that one of the two policies is superior (i.e. q i close to one) may be viewed as strongly liberal or conservative, while those with weaker opinions (i.e. q i close to zero) may be viewed as weak partisans, or even independents. 38 An informational view of ideology can explain why positions drift over time, and sometimes even shift abruptly in response to new information or epiphanies. 39 Informational considerations can also explain persuasive e¤orts such as debate, policy research, endorsements, and advertising, which are only worthwhile if a citizen expects her peers (once informed) to adopt her own positions. The references in Goeree and Grosser (2007) also document an empirical tendency for voters on both sides of an issue to believe that they belong to the majority, consistent with the formulation of this section. 40 38 The description of independents as slightly partisan is consistent with Flanigan and Zingale's (1998) …nding that self-declared independents who "lean" in favor of one candidate or the other resemble weak partisans as closely as strong and weak partisans resemble each other. 39 In the wake of the 2008 …nancial crisis, for example, former U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan famously testi…ed before Congress of a sudden realization that the ideology motivating his earlier e¤orts to deregulate the …nancial sector had been "wrong" (Andrews, Edmund L. 10/23/2008. "Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation", New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?_r=1). 40 The same pattern is evident in Fischer (1999).
Evidence and Applications
The central empirical prediction of this paper is that turnout remains bounded at moderate levels, even in large electorates, contrary to other models, which notoriously predict either that turnout should be quite low, or that everyone should vote. This section discusses a number of additional predictions that are consistent with empirical observation. In some cases, these provide insight into trends that have previously been viewed as puzzles. In other instances, they provide alternatives to existing explanations, implying a need for more detailed empirical analysis. Evidence in Section 6.1 relates to a citizen's use of her own information; evidence in Section 6.2 relates to a strategic response to the information of others.
Information
The central feature of equilibrium in the model above is that the strength of a citizen's opinion determines whether she votes or abstains. This is consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence that …nds information variables to be key determinants of voter participation. In Delhi, India, for example, Banerjee, Kumar, Pande, and Su (2010) report that individuals who receive candidate "report cards" are more likely to vote, especially when incumbent politicians have performed poorly. Lassen (2005) reports higher turnout in a referendum on government restructuring in Copenhagen, Denmark, in districts randomly chosen to experiment with the policy prior to the referendum. McMurray (2011b) cites numerous studies that …nd participation to be correlated with political knowledge, education, age, access to news media, and contact from campaign workers, among others. Palfrey and Poole (1987) and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1989) also …nd that citizens with strong ideological stances vote more frequently, and are on average better informed, than those with weaker positions, consistent with the informational interpretation of ideology described in Section 5.2.
The traditional explanation for abstention is that voting requires time, which is costly. Voting costs also provide a simpler explanation for the empirical connection between information and voting, since as Matsusaka (1995) points out, uncertainty reduces the expected bene…t of voting, making it less likely to be worth the cost. As Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) point out, however, abstention is not limited to costless environments. For example, voters frequently "roll o¤" by voting in some races, but skipping others on the same ballot, even though voting costs have already been paid. 41 Empirically, Battaglini, Morton,
and Palfrey (2008 Palfrey ( , 2009 ) demonstrate strategic abstention in a laboratory environment, and 41 Abstention is also commonplace in committees, where voting requires only the raise of a hand.
Wattenberg, McAllister, and Salvanto (2000) con…rm that citizens who continue voting are better informed, on average, than citizens who roll o¤. Another challenge to the costly voting theory is Downs'(1957) well-known observation that voting costs should dissuade all but a small fraction of the electorate from voting. A common assumption is that voters are motivated by a sense of civic duty, as Riker and Ordeshook (1968) suggest, but as McMurray (2011b) explains, the theoretical link between information and voting breaks down in that case: regardless of information, dutiful citizens should all vote, which should lower the pivot probability so that others all abstain. By contrast, as Section 4.3 emphasizes, participation rates in this model resemble those of actual public elections. Another result of the informational nature of voting in this model is that, as Sections 4.3 and 5.2 illustrate and emphasize, citizens' votes are correlated with one another, so margins of victory may be quite large. Speci…cally, margins are large when issues are in some sense obvious (i.e. average vote quality is high), such as ballot initiatives to update archaic government procedures or constitutional language, or elections to retain incumbent candidates who have clear records of high-quality performance. Empirically, margins are high in precisely these situations: historically, for example, the average margin of victory for U.S. gubernatorial elections was 23% (Mueller 2003, ch. 11); for many o¢ ces, popular incumbents even run for re-election unopposed. Coate, Conlin, and Moro (2008) report large margins of victory in local referenda over Texas liquor laws, but interpret this as evidence against rational voting models, because existing models often predict exact ties in expectation. 42 
Strategic E¤ects
An equilibrium prediction that is more subtle, but still quite central to the logic of this paper, is that while her own information makes a citizen more willing to vote, the information of her peers makes a citizen more willing to abstain. Direct evidence of this strategic delegation can be seen in the laboratory experiments of Morton and Tyran (2011) . In public elections, this prediction provides a possible explanation for Brody's (1978) otherwise puzzling observation that turnout in U.S. national elections has declined during decades in which education levels were rising. 43 Having forged a theoretical link between information and voting, for example, both Matsusaka (1995) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) predict 42 This occurs in Krasa and Polborn (2009), for example, even though supporters of one policy far outnumber supporters of the other, because free-riding incentives are more severe in the majority group. 43 Aldrich (1993) calls this observation "the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature."
McDonald and Popkin (2001) argue that declining turnout is an illusory e¤ect of decreasing voter elligibility, but the puzzle remains that education levels rose during periods that turnout did not.
that improving education should improve information, and therefore raise voter turnout. In this model, by contrast, improving information can also cause turnout to fall, as Proposition 3 demonstrates. Another implication of strategic voting is that, as Lemma 1 states, citizens increasingly abstain as the electorate grows large, in deference to those with better information. Consistent with this prediction, Geys (2006a) reports that about sixty percent of empirical studies …nd turnout and election size to be negatively correlated. The traditional interpretation of this …nding is that citizens are unwilling to pay voting costs in large elections, because a vote is less likely to be pivotal. The alternative explanation of strategic abstention, however, also provides a possible explanation for the forty percent of studies that …nd no signi…cant correlation, since turnout rates in this model converge quickly to the limit. Farber (2010) …nds evidence consistent with this in …rm-level votes on whether workers should unionize or not: turnout rates …rst decline with the number of eligible voters, but then ‡atten out as elections continue to grow. 44 The strategic theory also implies the same pattern in costless environments, such as roll o¤, suggesting a possible avenue for future empirical work. Like small elections, turnout is also higher in close elections, at least in two thirds of the studies reviewed by Geys (2006a) . This is traditionally interpreted as further evidence that a citizen only votes when her vote is su¢ ciently likely to be pivotal, but again, the analysis of this paper suggests a new possibility: for distributions with a high equilibrium threshold, turnout is low, but average vote quality-and therefore the margin of victory-are high; for distributions with a low threshold, the reverse is true. Thus, in the statements of Propositions 3 and 4, turnout and the margin of victory move in opposite directions. While this seems to be the general rule, it is not universal, as Figure 3 illustrates, perhaps explaining why more studies do not …nd a positive correlation. Also, while a more standard theory would seem to predict that the correlation between closeness and voter turnout should diminish as an electorate grows large, since in that case pivot probabilities are small regardless of closeness, Farber (2010) …nds exactly the opposite. Strategic e¤ects provide a possible explanation for this …nding, since the comparative statics results that are derived in Section 4.4 for large electorates are likely muted in small electorates, where the need for information quantity outweighs the need for quality, so a citizen votes regardless of the average vote quality of her peers (and thus regardless of the margin of victory).
The above applications highlight the ambiguous relationship between information and voter participation (or margins of victory) at the aggregate level. In some cases, however, macro evidence exhibits much less ambiguity: voter turnout is consistently higher in national elections than in state and local elections, for example, where candidates are more obscure, and is higher in general elections than in party primaries, where voters cannot infer candidate positions from party a¢ liations. The positive correlation between information and turnout at the macro level is not inconsistent with Proposition 3, of course, but suggests the need for deeper analysis. To this end, the nuance of Propositions 3 and 4 may be instructive: in local elections, for example, the variance of information seems likely to be high, because candidates may be personally acquainted with some voters and completely unknown to others, so low participation is to be expected. Similarly, the informational di¤erence between primary and general elections seems largest for those who do not participate in the primaries, suggesting that part 3 of Proposition 3 applies, and higher turnout in the general election is thus the natural prediction.
Conclusion
The model analyzed in this paper provides a deeper and richer analysis of information aggregation in elections than has previously been available. Most basically, it corroborates Condorcet's (1785) classic insight that election outcomes may be quite well informed, even if individuals are not. Because of this, however, a citizen with relatively little expertise has an equilibrium incentive to ignore her own information, and abstain from voting, in deference to those with better information. This is socially optimal, because it increases the impact of the best-informed votes. At the same time, however, citizens with only limited expertise continue voting, even in large electorates. This reduces average vote quality, but also increases the quantity of votes, thereby reducing the likelihood of a collective mistake. Thus, improving information increases welfare, but may cause turnout either to rise or to fall, and e¤orts to increase voter turnout, or to dissuade or prevent citizens with limited expertise from voting, may both be misguided.
Understandably, the dual message that voter participation can be either too high or too low may leave a citizen feeling con ‡icted as to whether she should vote according to her tentative private opinion, or abstain in deference to those with more complete information. Assuming that the rest of the electorate votes optimally, a simple rule of thumb could be for a citizen to anticipate voter turnout, and compare herself to the marginal voter. If she expects 75% voter participation, for example, she should vote as long as she is better informed than the bottom quartile of the electorate; otherwise, she should abstain. If she expects 50% turnout, she should vote if her expertise is above the median, and otherwise abstain.
Beyond the analysis of this paper, there are a number of important directions in which the model above should be extended and explored. Examples include the analysis of costly voting, and a more complete treatment of preference heterogeneity-issues that are central to political-economic research, but typically not analyzed in combination with commonly-valued private information. 45 Another example is the analysis of voters'preliminary decisions to acquire (costly) private information, which in the present model is provided exogenously. 46 Other possibilities include heterogeneous beliefs or correlated private signals, which could arise if voters commit cognitive errors in processing available information, or communicate prior to an election. 47 Also, the model could be extended to allow multiple states of the world, re ‡ecting the possibility that the quality di¤erence between the superior and inferior policies may be either large or small. 48 Ultimately, extensions such as these are unlikely to change the fundamental results that a citizen's own information makes her more willing to vote, while the information of her peers makes her more willing to abstain, so that at the macro level, voter turnout and the margin of victory are determined entirely by the distribution of expertise. As Section 6 emphasizes, these predictions are broadly consistent with-and provide novel explanations for-much of the available evidence from actual public elections. In particular, this can explain why voter turnout remains at moderate levels, even in large elections. Explaining empirical patterns is useful in its own right, and also suggests that voters do value the expertise of their fellow voters. This then corroborates Condorcet's (1785) informational view of elections, as mechanisms for pooling collective wisdom to identify good policies and candidates.
A Proofs
Proposition 2 (Swing voter' s curse) i is a best response to the quality threshold strategy T only if i is a quality threshold strategy T br , with quality threshold T br =P P +P .
Proof. That the best response to T is another quality threshold strategy, with threshold T br de…ned in (12) , is argued in the text preceding the statement of the proposition. If T = 1 then T prescribes abstention for citizens of all types (i.e. v + = v = 0), which guarantees 45 Morgan (2010, 2011 ) make progress in these directions. 46 Martinelli (2006 Martinelli ( , 2007 , Triossi (2011), and Oliveros (2011b) show that information costs may prevent elections from identifying good policies. Oliveros (2011a) shows that information acquisition decisions can lead to a non-monotonic relationship between information and voter participation. 47 A number of recent papers study how dependence in ‡uences information aggregation (e.g. see Peleg and
Zamir 2010), but not how it in ‡uences other election outcomes, such as participation. 48 Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) ), and a citizen of any information quality should vote in response (i.e. T br =
2
). If instead T < 1, a positive fraction of the electorate votes. Since voters honestly report their signals, which are positively correlated with the truth, the superior policy receives a larger expected vote share than the inferior policy (i.e.
, and is therefore more likely to be ahead by a single vote than behind by a single vote (i.e.
. This implies, however, that an additional vote for the superior policy is less likely to be pivotal than a vote for the inferior policy (i.e.P P = follows from (12) . That T br < 1 for any T follows from (12) because P is strictly positive, as N = 0 with positive probability, resulting in a tie. Lemmas A1 and A2 are useful in preparation for the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. For any quality threshold strategy T , let k denote the probability of precisely k votes for each policy:
With this notation, win probabilities can be rewritten as
, and 1 = P 1 k=0 k nv k+1
. Also, noting that 1 = v + v 1 , de…ne the ratio as follows, so that
In terms of , T br P P +P can be written as follows.
Implicitly, (6) through (11) depend on the underlying quality threshold T . Accordingly, let primed variables denote derivatives with respect to T . The derivative
on all of these derivatives, as follows,
where f is the density of expertise, c 1 =
, and c 2 and c 3 are given by
and
From (20) and (21) , the double sum in (30) would equal zero, because j k (k j) is positive whenever k > j, but the term with reversed indexes is negative and of equal magnitude.
Dividing by k + 1 places greater weight on negative than positive terms, so the double sum must be negative. Since c 1 is also negative, c 2 and 0 are both positive, and so is the second term of the sum in (31) . WhenP P +P = T br T , the …rst term is positive as well, implying that (29) is positive, as claimed.
Lemma A2 Let T A ;T B be a belief threshold strategy pro…le, with thresholds T A 1 2
; otherwise, both inequalities are reversed.
T B , citizens with a and b signals only vote A and B (or abstain), respectively, so v x (!; T A ;T B ) reduces from (2) to the following.
In that case, it is straightforward to verify that 
. Writing these probabilities in terms of v x (!; T A ;T B ) reveals that this inequality holds, given the inequalities above:
The …nal inequality holds because, whenever j k, the …nal product in (33) is less than one, so that the bracketed di¤erence is positive. For any negative term, therefore, it must be that j > k; in that case, however, the corresponding (k; j) term has otherwise equal magnitude but receives greater weight (i.e.
. Thus the sign of (32) is positive.
Maintaining the assumption that 1 T A > T B , a similar derivation reveals further that P ( )P ( T B ) >P ( ) P ( T B ) or, equivalently, that^ A0 > 1 T br (T B ), as claimed. Identical derivations for the case of 1 T A < T B yield the reverse inequalities.
Theorem 2
Proof. As Section 3 points out, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a game of Poisson population uncertainty is necessarily symmetric. By Proposition 1, it is therefore also a belief threshold strategy. To see that equilibrium thresholds must be symmetric around 1 2 , consider …rst the best response to a belief threshold strategy for which the thresholds 1 2 < T A T B both exceed 1 2 . In that case, individuals who receive b signals vote B only if they are su¢ ciently well-informed (i.e. q T B ), while those who receive a signals all vote A, along with some who received b signals but are poorly informed (i.e. q T A ) instead vote A. Thus, (2) reduces to
From these, it is clear that v A ( ) > v B ( ) and v A ( ) > v B ( ), implying that 0 ( ) > 0 ( ) and 1 ( ) > 1 ( ) and thereforeP ( ) > P ( ). It then follows that^ A0 = T B and T , which implies that T br (T B ) < T br T = T . By Lemma A2, this implies that
is not its own best response. Case 3:
T B 1 T A T and T br is increasing (by Lemma A1) between T B and T . Lemma A2
is not its own best response.
Symmetric reasoning applies, of course, if 1 T A < T B . Thus, is its own best response only if it is a belief threshold strategy for which 1 T A = T B , which is equivalent to a quality threshold strategy.
Proof. For a given quality threshold strategy T , vote shares v + and v for the two policies do not depend on the number n of citizens. Outcome probabilities do implicitly depend on size of the electorate, however, and can be di¤erentiated with respect to n, as follows.
The ratioP P of pivot probabilities can then also be di¤erentiated, by the quotient rule:
where P @P @n is given by
and similarlyP @P @n is given bỹ
The expression P @P @n P @P @n in (39) then simpli…es to P @P @n
which is positive for any T , since 1 > 1 and 0 > 0. Thus , however, so (14) has at least one interior solution between 1 2 and 1. Let T denote the largest such solution, implying that T br 1 (T ) < T for all T between T and 1. By Lemma 1, however, T br 1 is an upper bound on T br n , implying that T br n (T ) < T for all T between T and 1, as well. Thus, if T exceeds T then T does not constitute an equilibrium quality threshold for any n, and any sequence fT n g of equilibrium quality thresholds is bounded above by T . Such a sequence is increasing by Lemma 1, however, so a limit point T 1 T < 1 exists, as claimed.
Theorem 4
Proof. A log-concave density f …rst increases and then decreases with T , below and above some maximizerT 2 1 2 ; 1 . AboveT , it must be the case that
. To see this, …rst di¤erentiate (40) to obtain the second derivative of E (q i jq i T ),
which is positive if and only if
AboveT , the right-hand side of (41) is greater than 1 2 because f is decreasing, so f 0 is negative. If it were the case for some T >T that
, therefore, then the inequality in (41) would not be satis…ed, implying that E (q i jq i T ) is locally concave. But then
< 1 for a log-concave density, this would contradict Lemma A3.
BelowT , E (q i jq i T ) is necessarily convex. To see this, …rst note that the right-hand side of (41) is less than 1 2 , because f is increasing, so f 0 is positive. If the inequality in (41) were violated for some T <T , therefore, then there would necessarily exist some " > 0 such that
". However, the right-hand side of (41) is decreasing (by log-concavity) and as Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) demonstrate, h is increasing in T . As T increases, therefore, the leftand right-hand sides of (41) would decrease and increase, respectively. This implies that the inequality would never be reversed, so @ @T E (q i jq i T ) would continue to decline, and would be bounded above by 1 2 ". In particular, , however, the two functions can have at most one intersection point, because the slopes of T 2 T 2 +(1 T ) 2 and E (q i jq i T ) are bounded above and below one, respectively. 49 Thus, E (q i jq i T ) and and 1, implying a unique limit point T 1 for any sequence fT n g of equilibrium quality thresholds.
Proposition 3 Let F and G have log-concave densities f and g, and suppose that G …rst-order stochastically dominates F . Then the following are true:
1. If g (q) = f (q) for all q T 1F then T 1G = T 1F , G = F , and G = F . 2. If G (T 1F ) = F (T 1F ) then T 1G > T 1F , G < F , and G > F . 3. If g (q) f (q) for all q between T 1F and E F (q i jq i T 1F ), and g (q) = f (q) for all q E F (q i jq i T 1F ), then T 1G < T 1F , G > F , and G < F .
Proof. As a preliminary step, note the equivalence, for any T , of the following inequalities.
T br; T 1G T br; T 1F
(44)
The equivalence of (42) and (43) can be seen by integrating by parts; that (44) and (45) are equivalent to (42) follow immediately from equations (13) and (16). 1. If g (q) = f (q) for all q T 1F then (43) , and therefore each of the above inequalities, is satis…ed with equality at T 1F . In particular, (44) implies that T 1G = T 1F . Then G = F and G = F follow from (15) and (16) .
2. G (T 1F ) = F (T 1F ) implies that the denominators on either side of (43) are equal at T 1F . The numerator on the left-hand side strictly exceeds the numerator on the right-hand side, however, because G (T 1F ) = F (T 1F ) implies that G (q) < F (q) (i.e. 1 G (q) > 49 That @ @T E (q i jq i T ) 1 is equivalent to Bagnoli and Bergstrom's (2005) result that for distributions with log-concave densities the mean residual lifetime function E (q i T jq i T ) decreases in T . therefore neither do inequalities (43) through (45) . This implies that T 1G < T 1F , and therefore that G = 1 G (T 1G ) > 1 F (T 1G ) > 1 F (T 1F ) = F and G = 2E G 1 < 2E G (q i jq i T 1F ) 1 < 2E F 1 = F , as claimed.
Proof. Using integration by parts, the common mean of F and G can be written as
[1 F (q)] dq. Thus, the inequality in (43) does not hold, and therefore neither do (44) and (45) . This implies that T 1G
T 1F , and in turn that G = 1 G (T 1G ) 1 G (T 1F ) 1 F (T 1F ) = F and G = 2E G 1 2E G (q i jq i T 1F ) 1 2E F 1 = F .
Theorem 5 There exists a strategy that maximizes the probability of electing the superior policy. Furthermore, is a quality threshold strategy, with quality threshold 1 2 < T < 1, and constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The logic of this proof is to demonstrate that a strategy only maximizes welfare if it is a belief threshold strategy. A globally optimal strategy then exists by the Weierstrass extreme value theorem, because the probability of a desired election outcome is a continuous function over the compact set f(T A ; T B ) : 0 T A T B 1g of belief thresholds. That the optimal strategy also constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium follows from McLennan's (1998) observation that, in common interest games such as this, the socially optimal strategy pro…le is also optimal for each individual. Theorem 2 rules out the possibility of asymmetric belief thresholds, reducing the optimal strategy to a quality threshold strategy. That 1 2 < T < 1 then follows from Proposition 2.
The proof that every strategy is welfare-dominated by a belief threshold strategy T A ;T B proceeds by construction. As a preliminary step, letf ( ) denote the density of posterior beliefs ( jq; s) induced by the density f of expertise,
The conditional densitiesf ( j ) andf ( j ) can then be written in terms off ( ), as follows,
(1 ) f ( ) if 
is also increasing in v B ( ). Since T A ;T B increases v B ( ) and decreases v A ( ) relative to , therefore, it increases the total probability Pr (Bj ) of electing policy B in state , and reduces the probability Pr (Aj ) of an error. By a similar derivation, it also increases Pr (Aj ) and decreases Pr (Bj ), implying that it increases the overall probability 1 2 Pr (Aj ) + 1 2 Pr (Bj ) of the desired election outcome.
